## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

ALAN LEE WASHINGTON,	§	
TDCJ No. 1985581,	§	
	§	
Petitioner,	§	
	§	
V.	§	No. 3:25-cv-637-G-BN
	§	
DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID,	§	
	§	
Respondent.	§	

## FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Petitioner Alan Lee Washington, a Texas prisoner, filed a *pro se* motion for appointment of counsel that has been construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This resulting action has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from Senior United States District Judge A. Joe Fish.

And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that, because Washington's construed petition is an unauthorized successive habeas application, and considering that he has not actually filed a habeas application but only a motion for appointment of counsel, the Court should dismiss the application without prejudice to Washington's right to seek authorization from the Fifth Circuit to file a successive habeas application.

Washington originally filed a habeas application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 relating to his 2014 conviction in 2016, but the petition was denied on the merits. See

Washington v. Davis, No. 3:16-cv-2935-L-BT, 2018 WL 2451301 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2018), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 2441832 (N.D. Tex. May 31, 2018).

"A state prisoner is entitled to one fair opportunity to seek federal habeas relief from his conviction. But he may not usually make a 'second or successive habeas corpus application." *Banister v. Davis*, 590 U.S. 540, 507 (2020) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)). As such, Section 2244

lays out the requirements for filing successive petitions, serving as gate-keeper by preventing the repeated filing of habeas petitions that attack the prisoner's underlying conviction. The statute does not define "second or successive," however, and we have made clear that a petition is not "second or successive" merely because it is numerically second.

...

Later habeas petitions attacking the same judgment that was attacked in a prior petition tend to be labeled successive and must meet the standards for authorization under § 2244. In contrast, later habeas petitions attacking distinct judgments, administration of an inmate's sentence, a defective habeas proceeding itself, or some other species of legal error – when the error arises after the underlying conviction – tend to be deemed non-successive. In essence, if the purported defect existed, or the claim was ripe, at the time of the prior petition, the later petition is likely to be held successive even if the legal basis for the attack was not. If, however, the purported defect did not arise, or the claim did not ripen, until after the conclusion of the previous petition, the later petition based on that defect may be non-successive.

Leal Garcia v. Quarterman, 573 F.3d 214, 220, 222 (5th Cir. 2009) (footnotes omitted).

Washington has already exercised his "one fair opportunity to seek federal habeas relief from his [aggravated robbery] conviction." *Banister*, 590 U.S. at 507. And he acknowledges in his motion that the claims he intends to present are successive and would require him to obtain authorization from the Fifth Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) before this Court would have jurisdiction to consider the current habeas application. *See, e.g., Leal Garcia*, 573 F.3d at 219 ("AEDPA requires

a prisoner to obtain authorization from the federal appellate court in his circuit before he may file a 'second or successive' petition for relief in federal district court. Without such authorization, the otherwise-cognizant district court has no jurisdiction to entertain a successive § 2254 petition." (footnotes omitted)).

The Court could cure this want of jurisdiction by transferring this construed application to the Fifth Circuit for appropriate action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 But, given that Washington has not yet filed a petition setting out the bases for his request for habeas relief but only a motion requesting that this Court appoint counsel to assist him in seeking authorization for such a petition and drafting it, "a dismissal without prejudice appears more efficient and better serves the interests of justice than a transfer in this instance." United States v. King, Nos. 3:97-cr-0083-D-01 & 3:03-cv-1524-D, 2003 WL 21663712, at \*1 (N.D. Tex. July 11, 2003).

## Recommendation

The Court should dismiss Petitioner Alan Lee Washington's construed *pro se* application for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [Dkt. No. 3] without prejudice to his right to file, under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), a motion for authorization to file a successive Section 2254 application in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

**DATED:** March 21, 2025

DAVID L. HORAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE